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Health Insurance and Retirement Decisions
Abstract
We develop a rich model to study the complex interrelationship between health insurance and 
retirement decisions. The decision to retire depends on a number of factors including availability
of health insurance, health shocks, pensions, Social Security, and how consumption and health 
interact in the utility function. We incorporate these features in a computational model of optimal 
wealth and retirement decisions, solving the model household-by-household using data from the
HRS. We use the model to study two important SSA priority areas: first, to what extent do 
people remain in the labor force until age 65 in order to maintain health insurance for themselves
(and after age 65 to maintain health insurance for their spouses)? Second, do early retirees have
poorer health than others and does the availability of Medicare interact with their decision to 
claim benefits?
Citation
Scholz , John Karl, and Ananth Seshadri (2013). “Health Insurance and Retirement Decisions.” 
Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Retirement Research Center (MRRC) Working Paper,
WP 2013-292. http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp292.pdf
1 Introduction 
In this paper we seek to enhance understanding of the relationship between health insur-
ance and retirement decisions. Economic models of life-cycle consumption and wealth 
accumulation (that start at the beginning of working life) treat retirement as being ex-
ogenous, and therefore retirement is unaffected by unforeseen household circumstances, 
or abstract from decisions regarding medical expenses, treating these expenses as ex-
ogenous. We propose to develop a rich life-cycle model of optimal consumption and 
retirement decisions where the stock of health affects utility and longevity and is infiu-
enced by one’s health insurance status. We will use the model to study the complex 
interplay of saving/consumption decisions, retirement, social security policy and macro-
economic shocks. 
Health and consumption decisions are interlinked, yet the ways that consumption and 
health interact are hard to untangle. Health changes, such as disability or illness, affect 
labor market decisions and hence income and consumption possibilities. But causality 
also operates in the other direction, where consumption decisions such as smoking or 
exercise affect health. There are also unobserved differences between people in their 
ability to produce and maintain health and human capital, leading to correlations be-
tween health and lifetime income and wealth. This paper examines links between health, 
consumption and wealth. 
There are many possible ways to examine these links. Our analysis starts from 
ideas dating back at least to Grossman (1972), who argued that health is the cumula-
tive result of investment and choices (along with randomness) that begin in utero. We 
model household utility as being a function of consumption and health, where individ-
uals make optimizing decisions over consumption and the production of health. In our 
model, health affects not just utility but also longevity. Surprisingly, given the central-
ity of health to economic decision-making and well-being, numerical models of lifecycle 
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consumption choices generally treat health in a highly stylized fashion. Authors com-
monly do not model health as being an argument of utility and do not allow health to 
affect longevity (see, for example, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Engen, Gale, 
Uccello, 1999; Palumbo, 1999; and Scholz, Seshadri, Khitatrakun, 2006). Instead med-
ical expense shocks that proxy for health shocks affect the lifetime budget constraint. 
Households in these papers respond to exogenous medical expense shocks by decreasing 
consumption, saving for precautionary reasons. 
In this paper we formulate a lifecycle model that we solve household-by-household, 
where health investments (including time-use decisions) affect longevity and health af-
fects utility. By modeling investments in health, longevity becomes an endogenous out-
come, which allows us to study the effects of changes in safety net policy, for example, 
on mortality as well as wealth. Our model also captures the effects of poor health on 
sick time and hence on earnings and retirement. 
In the lifecycle consumption papers noted above, households will respond to cuts in 
safety net programs by increasing precautionary saving. In our model households might 
maintain consumption at the cost of activities that degrade health and consequently af-
fect longevity. In practice, these health-reducing activities might include working an 
additional job (and foregoing sleep); foregoing exercise; or eating high-calorie, inex-
pensive fast food rather than healthier home-cooked meals. Over the long run, the 
consequences of these decisions can be large. In a world without health-related social 
insurance, young forward-looking households may recognize the futility of accumulating 
wealth to offset expected late-in-life health shocks and simply enjoy a higher standard of 
living for a shorter expected lifetime. Depending on lifetime earnings or the economic 
environment, other households may sharply increase precautionary saving in a world 
without health-related social insurance. Our model provides quantitative insight about 
these responses. 
We, of course, are not the first to examine the links between health, consumption, 
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and wealth. Clear discussions are given in Smith (2005) and Case and Deaton (2005) 
and many other places. De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) and Palumbo (1999) are 
more closely related to our work. In their models, the only response that households 
have to the realization of medical expense shocks is to alter consumption. Death occurs 
through the application of life tables with random longevity draws.1 They document 
that late-in-life health shocks, including nursing home expenses, and social insurance 
play a substantial role in old age wealth decumulation. 
We build on the past lifecycle consumption and health literature in at least three 
ways. First, our specification of utility is different. Most prior papers that add health 
or medical expenditures to utility assume it is separable from consumption in pref-
erences. Two important exceptions are Murphy and Topel (2006), who use a utility 
function that features consumption-health complementarity to value improvements in 
health, and Yogo (2009) who models health and portfolio choices of the elderly in an 
economy that features complementarity between consumption and health. Health is the 
object of interest in our approach and we model health production. We allow con-
sumption and health to be complements or substitutes in preferences. In practice, we 
find consumption and health are complements and complementarity is quantitatively 
important to understanding the evolution of health and wealth as individuals age. In 
particular, consumption will optimally decline in old age, tracking the inevitable dete-
rioration of health, which implies consumption will be shifted to earlier periods in the 
1In section 9 of De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) they write down and estimate key structural 
parameters of a model where consumption and medical expenditures are arguments of utility, and where 
health status and age affect the size of medical-needs shocks. Their model is estimated on a sample of 
single individuals age 70 and over. They find that endogenizing medical expense shocks has little effect 
on their findings that medical expenses are a major saving motive and that social insurance affects the 
saving of the income-rich and the income-poor. 
Two other related papers model intertemporal consumption decisions and include health in the utility 
function. Fonseca, Michaud, Galama, and Kapteyn (2009) write down a model similar to ours and solve 
the decision problem for 1,500 representative households. Consumption and health are separable in 
utility in their model and the focus of their work is on explaining the causes behind the increases in 
health spending and life expectancy between 1965-2005. Yogo (2009) solves a model similar to ours 
for retired, single women over 65 to examine portfolio choice and annuitization in retirement. 
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life cycle relative to models that ignore health-consumption interactions. 
Second, most papers do not examine health investments and consumption decisions 
of households younger than 65. Health capital, however, may be well-formed by prior 
decisions and expenditures by the time an individual reaches 65. We model health 
production from the start of working life.2 Forward-looking households will respond 
to income shocks, health shocks, or to changes in institutions by altering their health 
investments and consumption during their working lives. 
Third, Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) and other related 
studies have shown that anticipated and realized medical expenses are an important 
determinant of wealth decumulation patterns in old age. The focus of our work differs. 
We develop a model of consumption and longevity to study how health and income 
shocks affect consumption plans, and how health and income shocks affect investments 
in health capital over the lifecycle. If death occurs when health capital falls below a 
given threshold, households may respond to policy or exogenous shocks by reducing or 
increasing consumption and hence altering longevity relative to a world where health 
is not an argument in preferences. Studying the trade-off between consumption and 
health investments on health, longevity, and wealth offers new insights into household 
behavior. 
The decision to retire is also something we model. An obvious way for some house-
holds to respond to perceived or actual shortfalls in retirement wealth is to work longer 
than they originally anticipated or to invest less in their health. Similarly, households 
with perceived or actual net worth surpluses may choose to retire earlier than initially 
expected. Of course, these households may also be concerned with the prospect of facing 
unusually bad health shocks or other necessary expenses or they may wish to leave assets 
to children or philanthropic organizations. Retirement decisions are also infiuenced by 
2Health is undoubtedly infiuenced by shocks and decisions made in utero and in childhood. We do 
not have data on these experiences, however, so lack of data and computational demands lead us to 
start our analysis at the beginning of working life. 
4
 
health status, which in turn is also a consequence of decisions made by individuals. This 
complex interrelationship is relatively understudied and has immense policy significance. 
Empirical studies uniformly find a large positive association between retiree health 
insurance and early retirement. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) estimate probit models of 
early retirement as a function of retiree health insurance, health, and other characteris-
tics using the first and third waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Madrian 
(1994a, 1994b) and Hurd and McGarry (1993) also find similar results. Gruber and 
Madrian (2002) characterize the literature as suggesting that retiree health insurance 
increases the retirement hazard by 30 to 80 percent. 
Another set of papers use structural models to analyze the effects of retiree health 
benefits on early retirement. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Lumsdaine, Stock, 
and Wise (1994), for example, factor health insurance into the budget constraint based 
on the average cost of insurance and find retirement behavior is similar to behavior 
that arises when ignoring health insurance, implying a small effect of retiree health 
insurance on retirement. Rust and Phelan (1997) take into account risk aversion and 
the full distribution of health costs and find larger effects of retiree health insurance 
on retirement than papers that do not model risk aversion. Blau and Gilleskie (2001) 
estimate a structural model of joint retirement by married couples and find little effect 
of retiree health insurance when health insurance only enters the budget constraint and 
a larger effect when health insurance is allowed to infiuence utility directly. 
Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips (1996) relate early retirement to health status, 
analyzing a sample of 62-year-olds observed in the Health and Retirement Survey. They 
compare the health and financial assets of those who took early benefits and those 
who did not and find that the great majority of people who take early benefits are in 
good health, a result that is consistent with the currently established view that most 
retirements are essentially voluntary responses to financial incentives. They report that 
fewer than 10 percent of men who take early benefits are in poor health and have no 
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other source of pension income beyond Social Security benefits. The comparable figure 
for women is 20 percent. Smith (1999) confirms the basic finding of Burkhauser and 
others (1996) using several panels of the SIPP. He concludes that most retirees who take 
early benefits do not report health problems that limit work. 
We build on several previous papers. Some earlier structural papers with endogenous 
retirement abstract from savings decisions. Most prior work assumes that health status 
evolves exogenously or that individuals face medical expense shocks. In our model, 
out-of-pocket medical expenses are endogenous and get translated into total medical 
expenses depending on the health insurance status of the individual. We model the 
evolution of health as well as labor supply decisions (separately for both members of a 
married household) and allow for health to affect utility as well as longevity. Most, if not 
all of these features are missing from the existing literature. We believe these features 
are important in understanding the interplay between retirement decisions and health 
insurance status. 
After calibrating our model to match key moments for the typical household, we find 
the model is able to match the cross-sectional variation in medical expenses, longevity, 
the stock of health and consumption in the Health and Retirement Study. We also 
match changes in wealth, health spending, and health status between 1998 and 2008. 
In addition, we match patterns of medical spending, health stocks as well as longevity 
earlier in the lifecycle. We finally examine the effect of health insurance on retirement 
decisions. 
2 Descriptive Facts 
We use Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from 1992 through 2008. The Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging and con-
ducted by the University of Michigan with supplemental support from the Social Security 
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Administration. The HRS is a national panel study with a sample (in 1992) of 12,652 
persons in 7,702 households. It oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida. 
The sample is nationally representative of the American population 50 years old and 
above. The baseline 1992 study consisted of in-home, face-to-face interviews of the 
1931—41 birth cohort and their spouses, if they were married. Follow up interviews have 
continued every two years through 2010. As the HRS has matured, new cohorts have 
been added. Our sample includes households from the AHEAD cohort, born before 
1924; Children of Depression Age (CODA) cohort, born between 1924 and 1930; the 
original HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 1941; the War Baby cohort, born between 
1942 and 1947; and the Early Boomer cohort, born between 1948 and 1953. The sample 
is a representative, randomly stratified sample of U.S. households born before 1953.3 
We start with 30,548 (19,058 unique households) individuals in the RAND HRS 
Version J (RAND, June 2010). We keep 11,494 households in which either the head 
or the surviving spouse responded in 2008. We drop 287 households with insuffi cient 
earnings to estimate the household fixed effect in the earnings model. Next, we drop 
35 households in which both the household head and their spouse are the same gender. 
This leaves with 11,172 households in our sample. 
In addition to a wide range of health information, the HRS has excellent measures 
of household financial well-being. To measure household net worth we use respondents’ 
reports of the value of primary and secondary residences, other real estate, vehicles, 
businesses, as well as a wide range of personal savings instruments (IRA, Keogh accounts, 
stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, checking accounts, saving accounts, money 
market accounts, CDs, government savings bonds, Treasury bills, bonds, bond funds, 
and “other savings”). Household financial liabilities are subtracted from the sum of 
household wealth and include the value of all mortgages, land contracts, and “other 
debt.” 
3Comprehensive information on the HRS is available at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/. 
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Observed household medical expenses are reported as both out-of-pocket and total 
expenses. In this paper we use the out-of-pocket measure, which includes the costs 
respondents pay for hospitals, nursing homes, doctors, dentists, outpatient surgery, pre-
scription drugs, home health care, and care in special facilities. While we have reasonable 
confidence in reported out-of-pocket medical expenses in the HRS, total expenses are 
considerably more diffi cult for a household to report accurately in an interview survey. 
Because of this we use moments for total medical expenses by age, cross-classified by 
insurance status, drawn from the 2008 Household Component of the Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey (MEPS) to calibrate parameters that map out-of-pocket expenses 
into total expenses.4 The MEPS is administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality and contains detailed information on health care expenditures. 
Our model must be capable of matching several descriptive facts about health and 
wealth. The first fact is perhaps obvious, but self-reported health declines with age. 
The HRS asks respondents about their self-reported health status, where respondents 
can respond on a 5-point scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor). Figure 1 
plots the average responses for two groups of responses in 2008 by cohort. The modal 
response for the four oldest cohorts is good while it is very good for the youngest cohort, 
the Early Boomers. The percentage of respondents reporting excellent or very good 
health declines monotonically with age across cohorts. The percentage of respondents 
reporting poor or fair health rises with age across cohorts. Recognizing this biological 
fact, health depreciates in our model of health production. 
The second fact highlighted is that exercise is positively correlated with lifetime in-
come as shown in Figure 2. This relationship is potentially important in a model of 
health production as there is abundant evidence that exercise, smoking, and diet in-
fiuence health and hence longevity.5 Nevertheless, the computational demands that 
4Information is available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/mepsnet/mepsnethc08.shtml 
5See, for example, Paffenbarger et al. (1993), Willette (1994), Mokdad et al. (2004), and Warburton 
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Figure 1: Self-Reported Health and Age (Birth Cohort), HRS 2008 
arise in solving our dynamic programming model household-by-household with endoge-
nous consumption and health production requires parsimonious modelling. Given this 
requirement, we assume health can be improved by investments of money and by invest-
ments of time. Specifically, time investments in health production reduce leisure. Both 
working and retired households face a combined time and financial budget constraint, 
which we describe in greater detail below. In this way, we capture the essential trade-off 
between non-health related consumption and health investment. 
The third fact is "the gradient:" health is positively related to socioeconomic status, 
whether measured by lifetime income, net worth, or related measures. As Figure 3 makes 
clear, the positive relationship between self-reported health and net worth is strongly 
present in the HRS. The Figure is similar when households are sorted by lifetime 
income quintile as opposed to net worth quintile. Illuminating economic decisions over 
the lifecycle that result in the joint distribution of health and wealth, household-by-
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Figure 2: Physical Activity and Lifetime Income, HRS 2008
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Lifetime Income Quintile
Figure 4: Ten-Year Survival Probabilities to Age 70 for Men and Women by Lifetime 
Income, HRS Data 
The fourth fact that our model must accommodate is that there is a strong relation-
ship between lifetime income and survival in the HRS. To show this, we restrict the 
sample to birth years that, in principle, would allow someone to reach a specific age by 
the last year of our HRS sample, 2008. So, for example, when we look at patterns of 
survival to age 70, we restrict the sample to those born before 1938. We also drop all 
sample members who were over 60 years old in the year they entered the HRS sample. 
The ten-year survival probabilities to age 70 shown in Figure 4 increase monotonically 
with lifetime income, from 74 percent for men in the lowest lifetime income quintile to 
89 percent for men in the highest. The gradient for women goes from 79 percent in the 
lowest lifetime income quintile to 96 percent in the highest. 
There are many likely explanations for the positive relationship between lifetime in-
come and survival. We write down and solve a model that captures several of these 
explanations. Households in our model have different draws on annual earnings and 
11
 
hence different lifetime incomes. They differ in the timing of exogenous marriage and 
fertility. Given differences in incomes and demographic characteristics, their consump-
tion and health investments choices will respond to health shocks (that vary by age), 
earnings shocks (which are also affected by health), and government programs in dif-
ferent ways. Moreover, we allow consumption and health to be gross complements or 
gross substitutes in utility. The work that follows, therefore, illuminates the channels 
through which health, consumption, and wealth are related. 
3 Model Economy 
In this section, we present the basic elements of our model and then proceed to describe 
the dynamic programming problem more formally. Even though our HRS sample begins 
when individuals are older than 50, we use restricted access earnings data for HRS 
households that typically starts when household heads are between the ages of 18 and 
25. Denote the age at which we begin to observe earnings of a household by S. We 
start the decision problem for a household at age S and assume, at this starting age, all 
households have zero assets and all household members, husbands and wives, have an 
identical stock of health. 
Demographics: With the exception of life expectancy which we model, other demo-
graphic variables are treated as exogenous and deterministic by each household. The 
number of children a household has varies over the life-cycle and this affects consump-
tion needs during the period of time they are attached to the household. This varies 
across households and is provided in the HRS. Households are either single or married 
throughout their lives - we do not model marriage and divorce. The marital status 
is set as of the first HRS wave. We do, however, model transitions from married to 
single status upon the death of a spouse that occurred after the first HRS wave. For the 
cohorts we study, divorce rates and remarriage were not as common as they are now. 
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Retirement is a decision that the household makes. One advantage with our data is 
that we have detailed information on all these demographic characteristics as of the first 
HRS wave. For each household, we specify in a deterministic fashion the exact ages in 
which children arrive and leave and whether they are married or single. 
Stochastic shocks: There are three sources of uncertainty in our model. First, there 
are health shocks, εj,g, that are assumed to be i.i.d across individuals and drawn from 
the distribution Ξj,g(εj,g), where j denotes age and g stands for gender that can either 
be female (2) or male (1). These shocks vary by gender and by age and adversely 
affects the stock of health. The variation by gender is essential to match the differential 
mortality rates of women relative to men. The increasing likelihood of these shocks as 
households age is critical to obtaining declining health status with aging. Second, we 
model household earnings as an AR(1) process where the i.i.d shocks vary by number of 
earners (ne), marital status (k), education (edu) and birth cohort of the household head. 
Specifically, the distribution of earnings at age j + 1, ej+1, conditional on earnings at 
age j, ej , is given by Ω
f,ne,k(ej+1|ej ) where f denotes household-specific variation that j,edu 
incorporates variation in the intercept term and k stands for marital status that can 
either be married (2) or single (1). Birth cohort is implicitly indexed in this distribution 
through f . Third, the probability of surviving into the following period depends on the 
stock of health. Healthier households are more likely to survive into the next period, but 
there is a chance that any individual can die at a given age. The probability of surviving 
into the next period is given by the function Ψ(h) where h denotes health stock. This 
function satisfies two properties. First, as h goes to ∞, Ψ(h) converges to 1. Second, 
Ψ(h) = 0 for h ≤ 0. This ensures that as soon as h goes to zero, the individual dies. 
The health stock affects utility and also affects the probability of surviving into the next 
period. Our formulation captures the notion that healthier people are less likely to die. 
Preferences and Choices: A household maximizes expected lifetime utility by choos-
ing consumption, health investments, and leisure. Incorporation of health capital into 
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an otherwise standard consumption-savings problem involves two additional choice and 
one additional state variable. It is nevertheless a significant complication. In addition 
to affecting longevity, we assume that households derive direct satisfaction from health. 
Lifetime utility for a single household at any age j in retirement, V 1 j,g, is given by 
V 1 = Max {nj U(cj /nj , lj , hj ) + βEj [Ψ(hj+1)V 1 ]}.j,g j+1,g
cj ,ij ,lj ,m
oop 
j 
This household maximizes expected lifetime utility by choices of consumption, cj , time 
oopinvestments in health, ij , leisure, lj , and out-of-pocket medical expenses, mj that affects 
the stock of health in the next period through a production function for health. The 
first argument inside the parenthesis denotes momentary utility during that age while 
the second term stands for the (expected) continuation value. The expectation operator 
Ej denotes the expectation over future health shocks. g is the gender of the head of the 
household, β is the annual discount factor, hj is the individuals’stock of health, nj is a 
household equivalence scale and is a function of the number of adults, Aj , and children, 
Kj , in the household, so nj = g(Aj , Kj ). 
We assume that health affects the time endowment of the husband and the wife 
through Grossman’s formulation of sick time: households experience some loss in their 
time endowment, s(hj ), which is inversely related to their health status hj . Upon re-
tirement, an individual splits his or her time endowment of 1 − s(hj ) in each period 
between leisure lj and activities that augment health investments ij . Before retirement, 
we assume that an individual spends an indivisible amount of time ω(hj , g, k, j, aj , ej ) 
working each period (this function is given exogenously) and spends the rest of his time 
endowment 1 − s(hj ) − ω(hj , g, k, j, aj , ej ) on either leisure lj or on health investments 
ij .6 In this formulation, whether people with lower stocks of health have less time to 
6In our model, we assume that poor health adversely affects the time that an individual spends in 
the labor market. While poor health may well affect investments in human capital and consequently 
the wage rate that an individual faces, we observe data on earnings and we do not observe either hours 
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spend on investments in health and leisure depends on the strength of two effects. On 
the one hand, lower health stocks are associated with more sick time. On the other 
hand, labor supply is increasing in the stock of health. Which effect dominates depends 
on the relative strength of the two effects. The decision problem during the working 
phase is very similar to the decision problem specified above with one notable difference. 
There is an additional source of uncertainty - uncertain future earnings for ages prior 
to retirement. A complete description of the dynamic programming problem for the 
working and the retirement phase is given below. 
The married household’s decision problem at age j in retirement involves taking into 
account the choices of two decision makers. The value function is given by 









2 = Maxj oop oop 
+[1 − Ψ(hh,j+1)]Ψ(hw,j+1)Vj1+1,2 cj ,ih,j ,lh,j ,m ,iw,j ,lw,j ,m +βEjh,j w,j ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
+Ψ(hh,j+1)[1 − Ψ(hw,j+1)]Vj1+1,1 
The first two terms inside the parenthesis above stand for momentary utility for 
the couple where µ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on the husband’s utility in household utility, 
hh,j is the husband’s stock of health, lh,j is leisure of the husband, hw,j and lw,j are 
oop oopcorresponding health stock and leisure of the wife, and m and m are out of pocketh,j w,j 
medical expenses for the husband and wife, which affect their stocks of health in the 
worked or the wage rate. Consequently, data limitations prevent us from disentangling the impact of 
bad health on the wage from the effect of bad health on hours worked. Furthermore, the analysis in 
French (2005) suggests that health status has a much larger impact on labor supply and labor force 
participation than on the wage rate. To be sure, if we did have data on hours worked, we would be in a 
position to introduce a labor supply dimension to our model. The lack of information on hours worked 
leads us to approximate a labor supply function for individuals in different states using data from the 
PSID. Besides health (h), gender (g), marital status (k), age (j), wealth (a) and earings (e), labor 
supply also depends on whether an individual is a union member, which is assumed to be exogenous 
and taken from data. Details are in the Appendix. 
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next period through health production specified below. The expectation operator Ej 
now denotes the expectation over future health shocks facing both the husband and the 
wife. The three products of functions Ψ and V inside the expectation operator give the 
continuation values of the household when both the husband and the wife live to next 
period, only the wife lives to next period and only the husband lives to next period 
respectively. Setting µ to be 0 (1) will give us the corresponding lifetime utility for a 
household headed by a single female (male). This representation of preferences captures 
the notion that while consumption is a public good within the family, leisure and health 
are largely the result of individual choices. Understanding the complex decisions made 
by members of a given family requires us to recognize that they are independent actors 
- something that our collective model does. 
The Production of Health: A challenge when modelling health is that there is at 
best mixed evidence that marginal expenditures on medical care in the U.S. buy greater 
health, and hence longevity.7 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “fiat of 
the curve” medicine. It is noteworthy just how hard scholars need to look to find 
evidence that expenditures on medical care have a discernible, positive effect on health 
and particularly mortality outcomes. Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008), for example, 
is one of a small number of studies that find expenditures are positively correlated 
with survival. Their work is based on a very large sample of people admitted to 
emergency rooms in California: they find positive effects of spending apply to a small 
subset of conditions that lead people to show up in emergency rooms. Doyle (2009) 
shows that men who have heart attacks when vacationing in Florida have higher survival 
probabilities if they end up being served by high- rather than low-expenditure hospitals. 
In addition to evidence that health investments enhance health, Oster et al (2012) 
7See, for example, the Dartmouth Health Atlas (http://dartmouthatlas.org/), which documents 
little relationship between regional variation in health spending and health outcomes. Finkelstein and 
McKnight (2008) find little effect of Medicare on mortality when the program was initiated. Chay, 
Kim and Swaminathan (2010) challenge this assessment. 
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show that those diagnosed with a terminal disease are less likely to quit risky behaviors. 
Specifically, they study the effect of Huntington disease on health investments. Indi-
viduals who learn they carry the Huntington disease mutation through genetic testing 
or symptom onset are much less likely to quit smoking than comparable individuals 
without this information. Those with earlier symptom onset are less likely to have ever 
undergone cancer screening (conditional on age). Of course, other studies suggest that 
marginal medical expenditures have little discernible effect on health. 
In addition to the evidence above, it is clear that some expenditures improve health. 
Antibiotics can effectively cure strep throat. Treatment can help people survive cancer. 
A good orthopedist can help people recover fully from broken bones. Given this, we 
assume that household members possess a health stock and investments improve health. 
The accumulation process of the stock of health for a household member is given by 
hj+1 = Ft(mj , ij ) + (1 − δ)hj − εj,g, j ∈ {S, ...}, g ∈ {1, 2} 
The stock of health at the next age, hj+1, is determined by the production of health, 
given by Ft(mj , ij ) which depends on calendar time t because we allow productivity of 
health technology to change over time. Health capital is produced using time, ij , which 
could be exercise or other health-producing activities, and medical expenditures. Total 
medical expenditures, mj , are a function M ins(·) of out of pocket medical expenses, 
moopj , where the function M
ins(·) is determined by health insurance status (ins) and 
will be specified later when we discuss calibration. In the above equation, δ stands 
for the depreciation rate of health. Introducing age-dependent shocks to health, εj,g is 
both realistic and necessary if we are interested in matching biological processes and 
the data. They vary by gender. In typical lifecycle models, medical expenditures have 
only financial consequences. Here medical expenditures have financial consequences 




�     R
oop oopcj + aj+1 + mh,j + mw,j = yj + aj − τ t SS ej + DB(eR) + raj , j ∈ {R +1, ...}
j=S 
approach mimics the modeling of human capital — additions to human capital can be 
either consumption or investment as in Becker (1964), Mincer (1974) and the subsequent, 
vast human capital literature. 
Budget Constraints: Consumption, health investments and leisure are chosen to 
maximize expected utility subject to the constraints. 
yj = ej + raj + Tt(ej , aj , j, nj ), j ∈ {S, ..., R}     
R R
yj = SS ej + DB(eR) + raj + TR,t eR, ej , aj , j, nj , j ∈ {R + 1, ...}
j=S j=S 
oop oopcj + aj+1 + mh,j + mw,j = yj + aj − τ t(ej + raj ), j ∈ {S, ..., R}
In these expressions y is household income, and e is household earnings, a is household 
assets, r is the interest rate, T is a transfer function that depends on earnings, assets, 
age and the number of adult equivalents in the household. The husband and wife in a 
household are assumed to enter the labor market simultaneously at age S of the head 
and retire simultaneously at age R of the head. Social security (SS) is a function of 
lifetime earnings, defined benefit pensions (DB) are a function of earnings in the last 
year of life, τ is a payroll and income tax function, and the transfer function for retirees 
(TR) is a function of the last earnings observation before retirement (which approximates 
DB pensions), aggregate earnings over the lifetime (which approximates social security 
income), assets, age, and family structure. Transfer functions (T and TR) and tax 
function (τ) are year-specific and thus indexed by calender time t. 
Timing: The number of children is exogenous in the model as is health insurance 
status. Household members are assumed to have perfect foresight on the entire paths 
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cj ,ij ,moop j β C
 (j + 1)dΩ
 (ej+1|ej )dΞj,g(εj,g)t+1,g j,edu 
εj,g ej+1 
of both fertility and health insurance, social security rules (SS), the defined benefit 
pensions function (DB), the time varying transfer functions (T and TR) and time vary-
ing tax function τ . If the household is not retired, the household realizes its earnings 
shock at the beginning of each period and then makes decisions on consumption, health 
investments and leisure. The health shock is realized at the end of each period after the 
decisions have been made. 
3.1 Working Household’s Dynamic Programming Problem 
A working single household between ages S and R obtains income from labor earnings 
and assets. The dynamic programming problem at age j < R for a working single 
household is given by 
f,nj ,ne,1W (ej , Ej−1, aj , j, hj ) = t,edu,g 
subject to 
yj = ej + raj + Tt(ej , aj , j, nj ) 
cj + aj+1 + m
oop = yj + aj − τ t(ej + raj )j 
= Ft(M
ins(moophj+1 ), ij ) + (1 − δ)hj − εj,g j 
Ej = Ej−1 + ej 
where Cf,work f,n ,n ,1t+1,g (j +1) = Ψ(h
j+1 e
j+1)W t+1,edu,g
 (ej+1, Ej , aj+1, j +1, hj+1). In the above equa-
tion,  f,nj ,nW e,1











(1 − µ)U(cj /nj, 1 − s(hw,j ) − ωw,j − iw,j, hw,j ) 
Cf,workβ (j + 1)dΩf,ne,2(ej+1|ej )dΞj,2(εj,2)dΞj,1(εj,1)t+1 j,edu 
εj,1 εj,2 ej+1 
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 max oop oopcj ,ih,j ,iw,j ,m ,mh,j w,j 
time utility for household f at age j in year t. Ej−1 stands for cumulative earnings up 
f,workto the current age while C (j + 1) gives the continuation value of the household. Wet+1,g 
integrate over health and non-health-related earnings shocks. The other variables are 
defined above. 
The dynamic programming problem for a single household at age R, the last work-
ing period, is almost the same as the above dynamic programming problem at age j < R. 
f,nj+1,ne,1The only difference is that, at age R, the continuation value, W (ej+1, Ej , aj+1, j+t+1,edu,g 
nR+1,11, hj+1), should be replaced by Vt+1,g (eR, ER, aR+1, R +1, hR+1), the value function for 
single retirees introduced below, because the household will be retired in the next period. 
Similarly, the dynamic programming problem at age j < R for a working, married 
household is given by 
f,nj ,ne,2W (ej , Ej−1, aj , j, hh,j , hw,j ) = t,edu 
subject to 
yj = ej + raj + Tt(ej , aj , j, nj ) 
oop oopcj + aj+1 + mh,j + mw,j = yj + aj − τ t(ej + raj ) 
= Ft(M
ins(moophh,j+1 h,j ), ih,j ) + (1 − δ)hh,j − εj,1 
= Ft(M (mhw,j+1 w,j ), iw,j) + (1− δ)hw,j − εj,2  ins
oop      






nj U(cj /nj , 1 − s(hj) − ij , hj )+ 
max
 nj+1,1 
t+1,g (eR, ER, aj+1, j + 1, hj+1)dΞj,g(ε,.g)⎪⎩
 ⎪⎭




Cf,work t+1 (j + 1) = 
f,nj+1,ne,2Ψ(hh,j+1)Ψ(hw,j+1)Wt+1,edu (ej+1, Ej , aj+1, j + 1, hh,j+1, hw,j+1) 
f,nj+1,ne,1+[1 − Ψ(hh,j+1)]Ψ(hw,j+1)W (ej+1, Ej, aj+1, j + 1, hw,j+1)t+1,edu,2 
f,nj+1,ne,1(ej+1, Ej , aj+1, j + 1, hh,j+1)+Ψ(hh,j+1)[1 − Ψ(hw,j+1)]Wt+1,edu,1 
f,nj ,ne,2 (ej , Ej−1, aj , j, hh,j , hw,j ) t,edu W denotes the expected present discounted value of life-
time utility for a married household f at age j in year t. ωh,j = ω(hh,j , g = 1, k = 
2, j, aj , ej ) and ωw,j = ω(hw,j , g = 2, k = 2, j, aj , ej ) are labor supply of the husband and 
wife respectively. The three product terms in Cf,work (j + 1) give the continuation values t+1 
of the household when both the husband and the wife live to next period, only the wife 
lives to next period and only the husband lives to next period respectively. We integrate 
over health shocks facing both the husband and the wife and non-health-related earnings 
shocks facing the household. The other variables are defined above. 
3.2 Retired Household’s Dynamic Programming Problem 
A retired single household between ages R + 1 and death obtains income from social 
security, defined-benefit pensions, and assets. The dynamic programming problem at 
age j for a retired single household is given by 




nj ,2V (eR, ER, aj , j, hh,j , hw,j ) = t ⎫⎤⎡⎧ 
nj ⎣




(1 − µ)U(cj /nj , 1 − s(hw,j ) − iw,j , hw,j ) 
Cretired+β t+1 (j + 1)dΞj,2(εj,2)dΞj,1(εj,1) 
εj,1 εj,2 
max 




yj = SS(ER) + DB(eR) + raj + TR,t(eR, ER, aj , j, nj ) 
oopcj + aj+1 + mj = yj + aj − τ t(SS(ER) + DB(eR) + raj ) 
= Ft(M
ins(moophj+1 j ), ij ) + (1 − δ)hj − εj,g 
f,nj ,1In the above equation the value function, Vt,g (eR, ER, aj , j, hj ), denotes the ex-
pected present discounted value of maximized utility from age j until the date of death 
for this single household. Total earnings up to the current period are denoted by ER while 
the last earnings draw at the age of retirement is eR. Note that these values do not 
change once the household is retired. Relative to the working phase, household indica-
tor f , number of earners ne and education of the head edu do not appear in the value 
function during retirement because these variables only affect earnings. 
Similarly, the dynamic programming problem at age j for a retired married household 
is given by 
subject to 
yj = SS(ER) + DB(eR) + raj + TR,t(eR, ER, aj , j, nj ) 
oop oopcj + aj+1 + m + m = yj + aj − τ t(SS(ER) + DB(eR) + raj )h,j w,j 
= Ft(M




ins(moophw,j+1 w,j ), iw,j) + (1 − δ)hw,j − εj,2 
where
 
Cretired t+1 (j + 1) = 
nj+1,2Ψ(hh,j+1)Ψ(hw,j+1)Vt+1 (eR, ER, aj+1, j + 1, hh,j+1, hw,j+1) 
nj+1,1+[1 − Ψ(hh,j+1)]Ψ(hw,j+1)V (eR, ER, aj+1, j + 1, hw,j+1)t+1,2 
nj+1,1+Ψ(hh,j+1)[1 − Ψ(hw,j+1)]Vt+1,1 (eR, ER, aj+1, j + 1, hh,j+1) 
nj ,2In the above equation the value function, Vt (eR, ER, aj , j, hh,j , hw,j ) denotes the 
expected present discounted value of maximized utility from age j until the date of 
death for this married household. The three product terms in Cretired (j + 1) give the t+1 
continuation values of the household when both the husband and the wife live to next 
period, only the wife lives to next period and only the husband lives to next period 
respectively. We integrate over the distribution of health shocks facing the husband and 
the wife in the married couple. 
4 Model Parameterization and Calibration 
In this section we specify functional forms and parameter values that we use to solve the 
model. We start by specifying functional forms for utility and health production. We 
then set some parameter values based on information from the literature or from reduced 
form estimates from the HRS. We identify the other parameters by fitting the predictions 
of the model for the typical household to data on wealth accumulation, medical expenses 
and survival probabilities. Once we have these parameter values, we then solve the model 
household-by-household and examine predictions for each household in our sample. 
Preferences: We assume that momentary utility for a household member has a 
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ρ{λ[(c/n)ηl1−η]ρ + (1 − λ)hρ} 
1−σ 
U(c/n, h, l) = + B. 
1  σ 
constant relative risk-averse form. We further assume the sub-utility function over 
consumption-leisure composite and health has a constant elasticity of substitution. 
Hence the period utility takes the form 
−
Following Hall and Jones (2007), B is a large enough constant to guarantee that utility is 
positive. The elasticity of substitution between the consumption-leisure composite and 
health is 1/(1 − ρ). The discount factor (β) is set at 0.97, the value used in Hubbard, 
Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999). We also set η = 0.36 
from Cooley and Prescott (1995). Finally, we set σ, the coeffi cient of relative risk aversion 
equal to 3, a value commonly used in many studies including Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes (1995). We analyze the sensitivity of our results to β, σ and η. We calibrate B, 
ρ and λ. 
Equivalence Scale: This is obtained from Citro and Michael (1995) and takes the 
form 
n = g(A, K) = (A + 0.7K)0.7 
where A indicates the number of adults and K indicates the number of children in the 
household. 
Rate of Return: We assume an annualized real rate of return, r, of 4 percent. This 
assumption is consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who find that the real 
rate of return for both equity and debt in the United States over the last 100 years, after 
accounting for taxes on dividends and diversification costs, is about 4 percent. 
Taxes: The tax function we use are taken from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). The 




1−ρτ ,t − ρτ ,t ]τ f,t = bt[yf,t − (yf,t + st) 




where b, ρτ , s are year-specific parameters to be estimated. To obtain these parameters 
for our sample window, we assembled data from 1951 to 2007 using the Statistics of 
Income volumes available electronically through the Boston Public Library. For each 
year, the SOI data gives the mean tax liability for a range of income classes (AGI). 
These data were used to fit a tax function in each year: 1951 to 2007. The criteria for 
the fit was to minimize the sum of squared errors in the average effective tax rate: 
Earnings and Earnings Expectations: Earnings data come from three sources: Social 
Security Administration Summary Earnings files, SSA earnings detail files (W2 infor-
mation), and HRS self-reports. In the process of assembling the earnings data priority 
is given to each of these sources in the order listed. Earnings data in the Summary 
Earnings files is subject to top-coding. Before imputing the top coded earnings observa-
tions we first check to see if W2 earnings records exist; these data are available for most 
respondents starting in 1978. If W2 data is not available, HRS self-reports of earnings 
are used (if available). 
The remaining top-coded earnings observations are split into two windows, 1951-
1977 and 1978-2007. In the first period no top-coded earnings are recovered from W2 or 
HRS data. A censored regression model is estimated to predict the top-coded earnings 
in each year using the following covariates: gender, education, birth year, race, census 
region, marital status, average percentile in the earnings distribution over the past 5 
years (if available), average percentile in the earnings distribution over the next 5 years 
(if available), number of children in the household, total years reported working, and 
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average real household net worth over the HRS study years (1992, 1994, . . . 2008). The 
covariates used are taken from the first wave the respondent appears in the HRS. 
In the second window, 1978 —2007 many top-coded earnings observations are recov-
ered using W2 data. An earnings model with the same covariates is estimated on the 
high-income observations that were recovered using W2 and HRS data. The parameters 
of these estimates are used to predict earnings for the high-income observations that 
remain top-coded. Starting in 1992 a new covariate, labor force status, is added and the 
covariates used for prediction are taken from the nearest HRS interview. Missing earn-
ings are filled in when possible using HRS responses. Missing earnings in years following 
the respondents’last year of work or retirement year are set to zero. Missing earnings 
are set to zero for respondents who report never having worked. Missing earnings for re-
spondents younger than age 17 are also set to zero. The remaining missing earnings are 
imputed via an earnings model using most of the variables listed above. The difference 
is that instead of using the spot in the earnings distribution, the respondent’s average 
real earnings in the past/next five years are used when available. 
Earnings expectations are a central infiuence on life-cycle consumption and health 
accumulation decisions, both directly and through their effects on expected pension 
and social security benefits.8 We aggregate individual earnings histories into household 
earnings histories, putting earnings in constant dollars using the CPI-U. The household 
model of log earnings (and earnings expectations) is 
log ej = α
f + β1j + β2j
2 + uj 
uj = ρ uj−1 + �je
where, as mentioned above, ej is the observed earnings of the household f at age j 
8Due to data and computational limitations, we assume that earnings expectations are independent 
of health status. Credibly relaxing this assumption would require data on wage rates, hours, and health 
prior to when households enter the HRS. 
26
 
T = max{0, c− [e+ (1 + r)a]}         
TR = max{0, c − [SS(ER) + DB(eR) + (1 + r)a]} 
in 2008 dollars, αf is a household specific constant, uj is an AR(1) error term of the 
earnings equation, and �j is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally distributed error term. The 
estimated parameters are αf , β1, β2, ρe and σ�. 
We divide households into six groups according to education, marital status and 
the number of earners in the household, resulting in six sets of household-group-specific 
parameters, which we then estimate separately for each of the five HRS cohorts (resulting 
in 30 sets of parameters).9 Estimates of the persistence parameter, ρe, across groups 
range from 0.69 to 0.82. 
Transfer Programs: We model public income transfer programs using the specifica-
tion in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995). Specifically, the transfer that a household 
receives while working is given by 
whereas the transfer that the household receives upon retiring is 
This transfer function guarantees a pre-tax income of c and implies that earnings, 
retirement income, and assets reduce public benefits dollar for dollar. To set c for each 
year we use information from Moffi tt (2002) for 1960, 1964, 1968 to 1998 and extend the 
series using data from The Urban Institute, Mathematica Policy Research Inc., Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the UKCPR National Welfare Data.10 These 
9The groups are (1) married, head without a college degree, one earner; (2) married, head without a 
college degree, two earners; (3) married, head with a college degree, one earner; (4) married, head with 
a college degree, two earners; (5) single without a college degree; and (6) single with a college degree. 
We estimate the parameters separately for the AHEAD, CODA, HRS, War Babies, and Early Boomer 
cohorts. A respondent is an earner if his or her lifetime earnings are positive and contribute at least 
20 percent of the lifetime earnings of the household. 
10 See http://www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx 
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data are at the state level so we take a weighted average according to state population 
in each year. Benefits have trended down since 1974 when the consumption fioor for 
a single parent, two-child family peaked at $14,767 (in year 2008 dollars). In 2007 the 
same family would have received transfers worth $11,308. 
Defined benefit pensions: Pension expectations and benefits come from an empirical 
defined-benefit pension function estimated with HRS data. The function includes indi-
cator variables for having a defined benefit plan and belonging to a union, and variables 
for years in the pension by the retirement date, household earnings in the last year of 
work and the fraction of household earnings earned by the male and the fraction earned 
by the female. 
Health Shocks: We assume health shocks follow a log normal distribution with mean 
µε and variance σ2 . Notice that we allow the mean to vary by gender and age. In j,g ε 
practice, we discretize the support of log health shock, which is the real line, into five 
grid points and call the one that gives the worst health outcome the bad shock. These 
five grid points are fixed and do not vary over age or across gender. The probability of 
getting a bad health shock, however, varies both over age and across gender because of 
εµj,g. 




, where total medical expenses are a function of out-of-pocket expenses, 
M ins(mm = oop) and health is also produced with time, i. We assume At grows at 2 
percent per year refiecting aggregate improvements in productivity of health technology. 
Total medical expenditures are related to out-of-pocket expenditures by a linear function 
that depends on insurance status. For the uninsured (ins = 0) this function takes the ⎧ ⎨ oop + m,m bad shock 
form, m = . In the absence of a bad health shock, health ⎩ oopm , no bad shock 
care expenditures come directly out of the uninsured household’s pocket. In the event 
that the uninsured household suffers a bad health shock, a baseline level of care, m, is 
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provided via charity care. 
For an insured household, total medical expenses are paid partially out of pocket 
and partially through insurance, m = D + ζ(m − D) + (1 − ζ)(m − D). There are two '   , '   , 
OOP insurance 
parts of out-of-pocket expenses, the deductible D and a fraction ζ ∈ [0, 1] of the balance, 
(m − D), that remains after the deductible has been paid. 
We use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to calibrate the parameters 
of the medical expense model for six different insurance categories. Households in which 
the head is younger than 65 may be: uninsured, insured with public insurance only, or 
insured with any sort of private insurance. Three more categories capture older house-
holds: Medicare only, Medicare with supplemental public insurance (but no private), or 
Medicare and any private insurance. 
To calibrate the value of charity care for the uninsured, we draw from Doyle (2005) 
who suggests the previous estimates "center around forty percent less care for the unin-
sured."11 The average total medical spending for the insured (under age 65) in the 
event of a health shock in the 2008 MEPS data was mi = $3, 768. Average out-
of-pocket spending for the uninsured was moopu = $861. Using the relationship that 
oop0.6mi = mu = mu + m we recover the average value of charity care in the event of an 
adverse health shock, m = $1, 400. 
To calibrate the “generosity parameter,” ζ, for each of the insurance types, we use 
estimates of the average deductible, average total medical spending and average out-of-
pocket spending. The spending model implies that moop = D + ζ(m − D) which can 
oop−Dbe rewritten to solve for ζ = m
m−D for each insurance types. The resulting values are 
ζ = 0.039 for households under 65 with any private insurance; ζ = 0.063 for households 
under 65 with only public insurance; ζ = 0.159 for households over 65 with Medicare 
11 See, for example, Currie and Gruber (1997), Currie and Thomas (1995), Haas and Goldman (1994), 
Long, Marquis, and Rodgers (1997), and Tilford et al. (1999) who provide information on medical care 
use for the insured and uninsured. 
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only; ζ = 0.145 for households over 65 with Medicare and some private insurance; and 
ζ = 0.042 for households over 65 with Medicare and supplemental public insurance. 
Survival Probability: The survival function is given by the cumulative distribution 
function Ψ(h) = 1 − exp(−ψ1hψ2 ). 
Working Time: As mentioned previously, working time ω(h, g, k, j, a, e) depends 
on health, gender, marital status, age, assets, earnings and union status and this is 
calibrated from PSID. 
Sick Time: We assume that the amount of sick time is given by s(h) = h−α . 
Initial conditions: The age S at which a household enters the labor market is taken 
to be the age of the household head when we first observe the household in our data, and 
thus could vary across households. Initial assets are set to be zero for all households. 
The initial stock of health is assumed to be the same for all husbands and wives. Other 
individual level heterogeneities include education, gender, marital status and household 
level heterogeneities include health insurance status and number of children. As men-
tioned earlier, these are taken to be what they were when a household first enters the 
HRS. 
4.1 Calibration 
While several parameters are set based on estimates from the literature or by estimating 
reduced form empirical models from the HRS, additional critical parameters still need to 
be specified. We use information on asset holdings, life tables and medical expenses for 
the typical household in the HRS to pin down these parameters. The 19 parameters we 
calibrate are λ, the utility weight on consumption relative to health; ρ, which determines 
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and health; µ, the weight on the 
husband in the household utility function; B, the constant in utility to guarantee that 
it is positive; ψ1, the coeffi cient on health in the survival function; ψ2, the curvature of 
the survival function with respect to health; ξ, the curvature of the health production 
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function; χ, the share parameter of monetary input in health production; δ, the annual 
depreciation rate of health; α, the elasticity of sick time with respect to health status; 
ε ε ε εσ , the standard deviation of the i.i.d health shock, µ65,1, µ75,1, µ85,1, µ85+,1, the mean of ε 
the health shock for men less than 65 years of age, between 65 and 75, between 75 and 
ε ε ε ε85 and above 85 respectively; and µ65,2, µ75,2, µ85,2, µ85+,2, , the corresponding values for 
women. 
To calculate these remaining parameters, we solve the dynamic programming prob-
lem for the ‘typical’married, single male, and single female households, where ‘typical’ 
is defined as the household with average earnings and medical expenses over their life-
times. We then use the decision rules in conjunction with observed histories of earnings 
and medical expenses to obtain model predictions. Notice that while we have earnings 
observations on an annual basis, we only have medical expenses starting in 1992. Hence 
we integrate out the lifetime sequence of health shocks before arriving at the model 
predictions for a given age. We then seek to obtain the best fit between model and data 
relative to the moments we seek to match for these three types of households in 1998. 
We emphasize that the implicit assumption employed in our strategy is that households 
are identical in terms of preferences and technology but face different constraints due 
to the evolution of shocks in the face of incomplete markets. Males differ from females 
in terms of the probabilities of bad health shock as they age to account for the greater 
longevity of women relative to men. 
The moments we use to identify and pin down the parameters are:12 
12 Moments for net worth data and the retirement age come directly from HRS data. Mo-
ments for total medical expenses come from the National Health Expenditure Accounts (using 
the personal health spending totals by age for 2004), drawn from http://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Age-and-
Gender-Items/CMS1242122.html. We disaggregate the National Health Expenditure Account total 
for married men, married women, single men, and single women using data from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Study. The mortality probabilities come from the World Health Organization, 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/mortality_life_tables/en/. The data on sick hours come 








Median net worth in 1998 for married couples (husband age 63.2, wife age 60.9) $246,312 
Median net worth in 2008 for married couples $281,200 
Median net worth in 1998 for single males (age 64.1) $91,740 
Median net worth in 1998 for single females (age 66.7) $81,708 
The probability of dying between ages 50-54 for males 3.08% 
The probability of dying between ages 70-74 for males 13.76% 
The probability of dying between ages 80-84 for males 31.69% 
The probability of dying between ages 90-94 for males 60.70% 
The probability of dying between ages 50-54 for females 1.834% 
The probability of dying between ages 70-74 for females 9.57% 
The probability of dying between ages 80-84 for females 23.94% 
The probability of dying between ages 90-94 for females 52.05% 
Average annual total medical expenses for married women age 60-64 $7,747 
Average annual total medical expenses for married women age 70-74 $12,417 
Average annual total medical expenses for married women age 80+ $17,896 
Average annual total medical expenses for single women age 70-74 $12,479 
Average annual total medical expenses for married men age 70-74 $13,255 
Average annual total medical expenses for single men age 70-74 $13,474 
Sick hours relative to total work hours at age 40 0.015 
The model with each calibrated parameter generates 19 non-linear equations with 
19 unknowns. We obtained an exact match between the model predictions and the 














Value 0.70 -3.6 0.43 0.17 32.1 0.30 0.42 0.65 0.86 0.034 









Value 0.0012 1.53 0.69 1.22 0.61 0.22 0.36 0.54 0.72 
The elasticity of substitution between consumption/leisure composite and health is 
1 
1 ρ = 0.22. Later on in the paper, we analyze the effects of changes in ρ to better −
understand its effect. The change in wealth between 1998 and 2008 helps identify this 
parameter. Consumption and health are complements and our calibrated value is very 
close to the estimates in Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013). In one of the 
first few papers that simulates a model with endogenous health, Yogo (2009) employs 
recursive preferences in a study of portfolio choices in retirement and finds that con-
sumption and health are complements in utility. Since Yogo (2009) uses Epstein-Zin 
preferences, his estimates are not directly comparable to ours (we use time additive 
separable utility) but it is comforting to note that a substantially different approach 
also finds evidence in favor of complementarity. In a married household, the weight on 
the man’s utility is 0.43, lower than the weight on the woman’s utility. The rate of 
depreciation of health is 3.4 percent per year. The share of goods in the production of 
health χ is 0.61, suggesting that time and goods are both important in the production 
of health. Finally, note that the probability of the bad health shock increases with age 
since the mean (in logs) rises from 0.3 for men less than 65 to 0.86 for men above 85. For 
women, the same object rises from 0.22 to 0.72. The smaller probability of a bad health 
realization at any given age for women relative to men is instrumental in matching the 
higher age specific mortality rates for men. 
As mentioned above, we match 19 data moments with the model to identify these 
19 parameters. Clearly, altering one of the target data moments changes more than one 
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parameter. Nevertheless, it is instructive to think about which data moments play a 
critical role for at least some of the more important parameters. 
A lower value of ρ will lead to a higher level of assets in 1998. In addition, a 
lower value of ρ will have implications for asset accumulation/decumulation late in life. 
Predictable declines in health ought to be associated with predictable declines in con-
sumption. Hence having asset levels in 1998 as well as 2008 helps pin down ρ. 
The parameters governing the production technology for health (for males) as well 
as the hazard function are pinned down by the mortality probabilities as well as medical 
expenses. Recall that health affects utility as well as mortality. The importance of 
health in utility (λ) as well as the significance of health in improving longevity are both 
simultaneously pinned down by these moments. The probabilities of dying as people age 
interact with the technology for producing health to determine medical expenses. For 
instance if diminishing returns set in quickly, substantial medical expenses need to be 
expended simply to maintain the stock of health. In contrast, if the medical technology 
were close to linear, then additional medical expenses will have a large effect on the stock 
of health. Hence, all these objects (medical technology parameters, importance of health 
relative to consumption in utility), as well as the parameters of the hazard function, are 
simultaneously pinned down by the probabilities of the bad shock and medical expenses 
as men age. 
Medical expenses for single women and probabilities of dying for men relative to 
women help pin down the probabilities of bad health shocks for women. In addition, 
mean net worth for singles relative to married couples shed light on the utility aggregator 
in preferences. A change in the parameter governing the importance of men relative to 
women in a married households (µ) will affect both the wealth of the married households 






With the calibrated parameters, we solve the dynamic programming problem by linear 
interpolation on the value function. For each household in our sample we compute 
optimal decision rules for assets and the stock of health from the oldest possible age 
(assumed to be 120) to the beginning of working life (S) for any feasible realizations of 
the random variables: earnings and health shocks. Recall that initial assets at age S 
are zero and initial health capital is normalized to the same value for all individuals at 
this age. These decision rules differ for each household, since each faces stochastic draws 
from different earnings distributions (recall they are household specific). Household-
specific earnings expectations also directly infiuence expectations about social security 
and pension benefits. Other characteristics also differ across households - the number 
of children and the ages at which these children enter and leave the household. 
We then use the decision rules in conjunction with the observed earnings and medical 
expenses to obtain the model’s predictions for wealth, health, medical expenses and mor-
tality at a given age. Since we do not have data on medical expenses before 1992, we in-
tegrate out the health shocks over this time period. Consider a working single household. 
Recall that the state variables are ej , Ej−1, aj , j and hj . We start at age S with aj = 0 
and hS = h. The decision rule for assets is given by aj+1 = Aj (ej , Ej−1, aj , j, hj). We 
have annual observations on earnings, ej . Knowledge of e also means we have knowledge 
of E. Since we do not observe health shock εj−1,g, which affects hj , we integrate out the 
health shock and assume that aj+1 = Aj (ej , Ej−1, aj , j, hj )dΞj−1,g(εj−1,g). Beginning 
in 1992 (when households are around 56 years of age), we observe the medical expenses 
chosen by the household. From this point, we use observed medical expenses to back out 
the health shock. Suppose that m� j+1 is the observed medical expense at age j +1. Then 
oop = Ft(M ins(m




As emphasized in the previous discussion, we calibrate key model parameters to the 
typical (married, single male and single female-headed) HRS household in 1998. The 
first question we address, therefore, is how the model matches household wealth, out of 
pocket medical expenses, and the stock of health. 
5.1 Net Worth and Medical Expenses 
We summarize results for household wealth and out-of-pocket medical expenses by show-
ing median values, breaking households into lifetime income quintiles.13 In Table 2 we 
present a comparison of the cross-sectional implications of the model in 1998 and in 
2008. The 1998 cross-section is made up of the household heads from all birth cohorts 
that participated in the 1998 HRS interview (n = 9,041) and likewise for the 2008 cross-
section (n = 11,172, our full HRS sample). The vast majority of the difference (2,131 
households) are households in the “early boomers”cohort who were added to the HRS 
in 2004 and hence are not a part of the 1998 cross-section. 
13 Lifetime income is defined within four roughly equal-sized age groups: under 60, 60 to 65, 66 to 





MEDIAN NET WORTH AND OOP MEDICAL EXPENSES, 1998 AND 2008
 
Median Net Worth ($) Median OOP Medical Expenses ($) 
Lifetime Income Data Model Data Model 
1998 
Lowest Quintile 33,588 31,456 413 421 
Second Quintile 60,717 53,483 646 729 
Middle Quintile 97,212 93,708 904 967 
Fourth Quintile 180,859 163,695 1098 1081 
Highest Quintile 340,144 353,129 1,219 1,235 
2008 
Lowest Quintile 15,495 16,394 370 356 
Second Quintile 63,900 61,304 775 844 
Middle Quintile 136,000 132,453 1,083 1,137 
Fourth Quintile 238,000 248,120 1,425 1,413 
Highest Quintile 443,000 432,230 1,795 1,735 
There are two striking features of Table 2. First, while we calibrate the model to 
the average household in 1998, the model does a good job matching the wide variation 
in wealth across low and high lifetime income households in 1998. In particular, the 
correlation of actual and optimal net worth in 1998 is 0.71. Scholz, Seshadri, and 
Khitatrakun (2006) report a correlation between model predications and net worth in 
the HRS of 0.86 in 1992. There are a number of differences between our earlier work and 
this paper. The most important is that health affects utility and longevity, households 
make endogenous health investments, we model the health decisions of spouses, new 
cohorts have been added to the data and we now look at a more recent period, and 
we have new estimates of the earning process, which show somewhat more volatility in 
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earnings than our previous estimates, among other changes. Despite these differences 
our earlier qualitative conclusion still holds: Most Americans appear to be preparing 
for retirement in a manner consistent with our life-cycle model given the current policy 
environment. 
Predicted median out-of-pocket medical expenses also match actual expenses fairly 
closely. For instance, in 1998, the out of pocket medical expenses rise from $421 for the 
lowest lifetime income quintile to $1,235 for the highest income quintile. This tracks the 
data pretty closely. Richer households spend more out of pocket (despite possessing 
better health on average at the same age) and these investments affect both fiow utility as 
well as longevity. The household-by-household correlation between actual out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures and optimal out-of-pocket medical expenditures in the model is 
0.47. 
The second striking feature of Table 2 is the degree to which we match the disper-
sion of median net worth and out-of-pocket medical expenditures by lifetime income 
quintile at a later date (2008). We use only one net worth moment for 2008 (the net 
worth of married couples): health expenses are for 2004 (due to the timing of the 
National Health Expenditure Accounts). Yet the behavioral model augmented with 
preference parameters calibrated to the average household in 1998, data on changes in 
household composition, and earnings realizations (for those still in the labor market) 
is able to closely match the 2008 distribution of median net worth and out—of-pocket 
health spending. 
5.2 Health Status 
Another feature of the HRS are questions on self reported health status, which we used in 
Figures 1 and 3. Households report this on a 5 point scale ranging from poor to excellent. 
In the model, the stock of health is a continuous variable and hence to compare with the 













Bottom Second Middle Fourth Highest
Data: Excellent or very good Data: Fair or poor
Model: Excellent or very good Model: Fair or poor
Lifetime Income Quintile
Figure 5: Self-Reported Health Status in 1998: Model vs Data 
percent of the sample report excellent health, 28 percent report very good, 30 percent 
report good, 19 percent report fair and 9 percent report poor. We choose the cut-off 
points in the continuous distribution so that these percentages are what we observe in 
the HRS. Figures 5 and 6 depict the relationship between model and data for 1998 and 
2008 in greater detail. 
There is a very tight link between lifetime income and the self-reported health sta-
tus and the model does an excellent job tracking the variation in the data. Various 
model features come into play here - as households age, they receive adverse shocks 
with greater intensity. Their ability to buffer these shocks depends largely on health 
investments they had made in the past (which determines their current health status) as 
well as their income. The pace with which health deteriorates in older ages also affects 
consumption (recall that consumption and health are complements) which in turn af-
fects wealth accumulation. The fact that the model is able to match the extent to which 













Bottom Second Middle Fourth Highest
Data: Excellent or very good Data: Fair or poor
Model: Excellent or very good Model: Fair or poor
Lifetime Income Quintile
Figure 6: Self-Reported Health Status in 2008: Model vs Data 
a reasonable description of the evolution of health by lifetime income. 
Our model makes predictions not just during the retirement phase but also through-
out the working phase of the life-cycle. Unfortunately, the HRS data begin in 1992 
and consequently we do not have information on the behavior of these households while 
they are working. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare model predictions with best 
available data. 
5.2.1 Health During the Working Phase 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) also contains information on a self-
reported health status (5 point scale) much like the HRS data. Measures of the dis-
tribution of health by age and income come from the 2009 wave of the PSID. The PSID 
is a longitudinal panel that began in 1968. By 2009 the sample size has grown to include 
more than 9,000 families. The analysis in this subsection will compare model simula-
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Figure 7: Percent Reporting "Very Good" Health Status: Model vs PSID Data 
respondents’perceived health on a Likert scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor). 
Income quintiles are defined using the household head’s 2008 labor, business, and farm 
income. 
Before proceeding with the comparison, it is useful to note that while the PSID data 
are for the 2009 cross-section, the model simulations we present are for cohorts born 
much earlier. Consequently, the policies and opportunities faced by these households 
are quite different from the current cross-section and hence there could have been large 
differences in the distribution of health status by age. In the interests of space, we report 
the comparison between model and data for one of the self-reported health status: "very 
good". The results are in Figure 7. 
The Figure presents a comparison between self-reports of "very good" in the PSID 
with its model counterpart at various ages for 5 income quintiles (these are income levels 
at that age and not lifetime income). While the fit is far from perfect, the model is able 
to track the declines in health by age as well as evolution of health with income. The 
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fit is a better at higher income levels and among those aged 40-49 and 50-59. 
5.3 Consumption in Retirement 
One other feature of our data set is the availability of consumption data. While consump-
tion data are not available for the entire sample under study, hence making it impossible 
to compare model and data household by household, consumption data are available for 
a sub-sample of the population. Wave nine of the Consumption and Activities Mail Sur-
vey (CAMS) was completed by 3,587 individuals on behalf of their household. CAMS 
respondents report 2009 household spending in 39 categories of nondurables and durable 
goods. We calculate total household spending on these categories weighted using CAMS 
household weights that adjust for both sample design and non-responses to both the 
HRS as well as the CAMS survey. The household spending is thus representative of 
American households aged 50 and above in 2009. 
We normalize the consumption of an average household in the third quintile to 1 and 
report in Table 3 the consumption levels of households in the 5 different lifetime earnings 
quintiles for each of the self-reported health status for the cross-section of households in 
2008. As can be seen from Table 3, consumption rises with income for each health status 
and consumption rises with health status for each income quintile. The fit between model 
and data is fairly good and the fact that consumption co-moves with health status in 





MEAN CONSUMPTION BY HEALTH STATUS AND LIFETIME EARNINGS
 
Earnings Bottom Quintile Second Quintile Middle Quintile Fourth Quintile Highest Quintile 
Health Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data 
Excellent 0.95 0.93 1.04 1.02 1.16 1.15 1.24 1.29 1.54 1.68 
Very Good 0.79 0.75 0.93 0.91 1.12 1.20 1.20 1.23 1.44 1.55 
Good 0.71 0.69 0.91 0.88 1.01 1.00 1.15 1.13 1.36 1.38 
Fair 0.65 0.64 0.84 0.73 0.92 0.87 1.05 1.04 1.31 1.29 
Poor 0.60 0.61 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.79 0.96 0.92 1.28 1.24 
5.4 Medical Expenses During Working Years 
We have information on the distribution of out-of-pocket medical expenses by age and 
income from the 2008 Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS). MEPS is nationally representative for the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized 
population. The calculations shown in Table 4 under the columns labeled ‘Data’were 
derived using the MEPSnet Query Tools and public use file HC121 with sample size 
12,696 (2008 Full Year Consolidated Data File). The medical expenditure variable in-
cludes the total amount paid by the individual or their family for: medical provider vis-
its, hospital outpatient visits, hospital emergency room visits, hospital inpatient stays, 
dental visits, home health care, vision aids, other medical equipment and services, and 
prescribed medicines. Income is a comprehensive measure of person-level income. 
The same caveat that applied to the comparison between model and data for health 
during working years applies here as well - the data are from a cross-section while the 
model simulations are for the HRS cohorts. The model is able to track the rise in medical 
spending by age as well as the variation by income. Rather interestingly, the model’s fit 
for the age range 60-69 is quite a bit better than for the other ages. We attribute it to 





MEDIAN OUT-OF-POCKET MEDICAL EXPENSES ($) BY AGE AND INCOME
 
Income Bottom Quintile Second Quintile Middle Quintile Fourth Quintile Highest Quintile 
Age Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data 
20-29 131 197 145 206 156 221 198 283 202 300 
30-39 177 228 168 226 182 253 231 270 208 295 
40-49 199 268 201 336 213 315 274 333 234 354 
50-59 285 446 267 438 342 585 365 529 312 514 
60-69 652 678 635 669 647 636 701 722 671 749 
5.5 Mortality 
A novel feature of our economic model is that it allows us to examine the effects of policy 
changes on mortality. But the confidence readers have with our mortality results will 
depend, in part, on the ability of the model to reproduce mortality patterns in the HRS. 
To examine this, we take 10-year mortality probabilities in the HRS for two groups — 
those who are 60 years old and those who are 75 years old. Specifically, we restrict 
the sample to people first observed in the HRS before (or when) they reach age 60 and 
who, conditional on survival, would have been at least 70 in 2008. We make similar 
calculations for the age 75 sample. The entries in the table below under "Data" give 
the survival probabilities by lifetime income quintile. 
The mortality calculations implied by the model require considerable calculation. 
For example, in the first two columns of Table 5 we take all 60 year olds. These 
households face many different patterns of potential health shocks (εj,g paths). We 
integrate out over all potential sequences between the ages 60 and 70 and calculate the 
mass of survivors. These calculations require, of course, the optimal decision rules over 
the lifetime of households. We make similar calculations for households age 75. The 
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survival rates implied by the model are given in Table 5 under the column "Model." 
TABLE 5
 
TEN-YEAR SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES, MODEL vs DATA
 
Age60 Age 75 
Lifetime Income Data Model Data Model 
Bottom Quintile 0.77 0.76 0.54 0.52 
Second Quintile 0.83 0.81 0.54 0.53 
Middle Quintile 0.86 0.84 0.52 0.55 
Fourth Quintile 0.90 0.87 0.62 0.60 
Highest Quintile 0.92 0.89 0.64 0.62 
The model does a strikingly good job matching survival patterns in the underlying 
data, though we note that seven of the 19 moments that we use to calibrate the model tie 
down mortality probabilities by age for households with average lifetime incomes. This 
does not, however, imply that we would expect the model to reproduce survival patterns 
for high- or low-lifetime income quintile households. Both at age 60 and 75, there are 
substantial deviations between the survival data and predictions for households in the 
highest lifetime income quintiles. These are likely to be the households that are most 
effi cient in producing health capital. At age 75 there is also a substantial deviation 
between data and model in the lowest lifetime income quintile. This is the pattern we 
expect to see as unobservable effi ciency in health investment should make low-income 
households in the HRS who survive to age 75 healthier than the average low-income 
households in the model. 
5.5.1 Mortality During Working Years 
In our model, health shocks get increasingly likely as households age. What does our 
model say about mortality at younger ages? The National Offi ce of Vital Statistics 
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publishes life tables and these tables are available for the cohort born between 1939-41. 
In Table 6 we present the 10 year survival probabilities for this cohort and compare that 
with the model-implied survival probabilities for the HRS cohort born between 1931 and 
1941 for men and women. Recall that men and women draw health shocks from different 
distributions. Before age 65, these shocks do not vary by age. The main age effect is 
the depreciation in health capital that induces different investments in health capital as 
individuals age and hence makes individuals more susceptible to health shocks as they 
age. Table 6 presents the comparison between model and data. The model implied 
survival probability closely tracks the life tables for the cohort born at approximately 
the same time adding further credibility to our modeling of health. 
TABLE 6
 
TEN-YEAR SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES, MODEL vs DATA
 
Men Women 
Age Model Data Model Data 
20 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 
30 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 
40 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 
50 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.88 
NOTE.-Model moments are for HRS cohort. Data moments come from
 
United States Life Tables and Actuarial Tables, 1939-1941. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life39-41_acturial.pdf 
6 The Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement 
There is a very tight link between lifetime income and the self-reported health status 
and the model does an excellent job at tracking the variation in the data. Various 
model features come into play here - as households age, they receive adverse shocks 
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with greater intensity. Their ability to buffer these shocks depends largely on health 
investments they had made in the past (which determines their current health status) 
as well as their income. The pace at which health deteriorates in older ages also affects 
consumption (recall that consumption and health are complements) which in turn affects 
wealth accumulation. The fact that the model is able to match the extent to which 
health worsens between 1998 and 2008 adds to our confidence that the model provides 
a reasonable description of the evolution of health by lifetime income. 
A final feature of our model is retirement. Recall that the decision to retire is 
endogenous. Table 7 provides the fit between model and data on retirement age. 
Table 7: Retirement Age, Model Prediction and HRS Data 
Median Retirement Age by Self Reported Health Status 
Lifetime Income Excellent V. Good Good Fair Poor 
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Bottom Quintile 61 61 61 60 60 59 57 58 54 55 
Second Quintile 60 61 63 62 62 61 61 61 57 57 
Middle Quintile 62 62 62 62 62 62 60 61 60 59 
Fourth Quintile 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 61 61 60 
Highest Quintile 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
In the data, low lifetime income households with poor health status retire early (age 
54) while the majority of households retire at 62. The early retirement of poor households 
is triggered by the early onset of bad health shocks. These households typically have low 
earnings options and hence choose to retire early. Richer households who have better 
health expect to live longer and hence choose to retire later, partly to finance a longer 
retirement period. 
There are many reasons why scholars and policy-makers are interested in the effect of 
health insurance on retirement. Most health insurance in the United States is provided 
by employers until eligibility for public health insurance for the elderly (Medicare) begins 
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at age 65. Some employer health insurance plans provide coverage for retired workers, 
but others do not. Reform proposals that would make health insurance coverage inde-
pendent of employment status could increase the already-high rate of retirement before 
age 65, which could increase financial pressure on Medicare and Social Security. 
We used our model to study the interplay of wealth accumulation, health ac-
cumulation, health insurance status and retirement decisions. We will now examine 
how health shocks and health insurance affect retirement decisions. With a clear un-
derstanding of the infiuence of these factors in the model, we will then examine how 
workers in our model would optimally respond to various policy changes — changes in 
Social Security benefits as well as changes to the normal retirement age. The model also 
provides an excellent framework for understanding the effects of a health shocks between 
ages 55 and 65 on health status and the decision to retire early. The model can be used 
to analyze whether and how the availability of Medicare interacts with the decision to 
claim benefits, particularly for low income individuals. 
Our analysis reveals several interesting findings. While health shocks lead to re-
tirement well before age 62, our findings reveal that around 85% of early retirees at 
age 62 are in good health. This is consistent with the findings of Burkhauser, Couch, 
and Phillips (1996) and Smith (1999). Burkhauser et al (1996) compare the health and 
financial assets of those who took early benefits and those who did not and find that 
the great majority of people who take early benefits are in good health, a result that 
is consistent with the currently established view that most retirements are essentially 
voluntary responses to financial incentives. They report that fewer than 10 percent of 
men who take early benefits are in poor health and have no other source of pension 
income beyond Social Security benefits. The comparable figure for women is 20 percent. 
Smith (1999) confirms the basic finding of Burkhauser and others (1996) using several 
panels of the SIPP. He concludes that most retirees who take early benefits do not report 
health problems that limit work. 
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Next, we examine the impact of the availability of retiree health insurance on the 
decision to retire early. Empirical studies uniformly find a large positive association 
between retiree health insurance and early retirement. On the other hand, structural 
models that analyze the effects of retiree health benefits on early retirement factor health 
insurance into the budget constraint based on the average cost of insurance and find re-
tirement behavior is similar to behavior that arises when ignoring health insurance, 
implying a small effect of retiree health insurance on retirement. Blau and Gilleskie 
(2001) estimate a structural model of joint retirement by married couples and find little 
effect of retiree health insurance when health insurance only enters the budget constraint 
and a larger effect when health insurance is allowed to infiuence utility directly. Our 
simulations reveal that there are two opposing effects at work. On the one hand, the 
availability of health insurance in retirement makes retirement more attractive thereby 
making it optimal to retire earlier. On the other hand, investments in health are comple-
mentary with the availability of health insurance. The fact that this health insurance is 
available at a later date makes additional investments in health more attractive. These 
investments are costly and to defray these costs, the household finds it optimal to delay 
retirement. The former dominates the latter for households who are 60 or older and 
for whom retirement in imminent. On the other hand, for households who are younger 
and hence have more time to respond to changes in policy, the two effects might well 
cancel. Clearly, the interplay between these forces depends on the age of the household 
when the policy change in being enacted. If for instance, the household knew at age 
20 that retirement health insurance was available, they will invest more in health and 
possess a higher health stock than an otherwise identical household without acces to 
retirement health insurance. We perform an experiment where we remove post-retiree 
health insurance for households with such coverage - we assume that this is known to 
the household at the beginning of working life. On average we find that the first effect 
dominates and the availability of postretirement health insurance induces households to 
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retire about 3 months earlier than their counterparts without such insurance. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we describe a lifecycle model of consumption with endogenous investments 
in health. Health affects longevity as well as utility and we find that consumption 
and health are complementary inputs in the utility function. The model has many 
features: households build health capital with investments of both time and money; 
insurance affects the transformation of out-of-pocket medical expenses to total medical 
expenses; the health status of two spouses in a marriage evolve distinctly, and health 
affects time endowment and labor supply and earnings affect health. We solve the 
model household-by-household using data from the HRS. We force the model to match 
moments on wealth, mortality, and medical expenses for the average HRS married and 
single households, calibrating 19 parameters. We take these parameters as primitives 
for all households and vary the circumstances of the households based on observables 
in the HRS data such as earnings and medical expense realizations, insurance status, 
marital status, and demographic variables. We then ask whether this framework with 
the 19 parameters identified by the typical household can account for the microeconomic 
variation in health, wealth, mortality and retirement across the 11,172 households we 
analyze. We find that it can. Our study makes several contributions. 
First, the model successfully accounts for the variation in medical expenses and 
longevity across households. In addition, the fit between the model and data on health 
status is excellent. We conclude that the model can rationalize a significant fraction of 
the variation in health across households. 
Second, while health shocks lead to retirement well before age 62, our findings reveal 
that around 85% of early retirees at age 62 are in good health. This is consistent with 
the findings in the literature 
50
 
Third, isolate the effects in play when households consider whether to respond to the 
availability of retiree health insurance by retiring early. We perform an experiment where 
we remove post-retiree health insurance for households with such coverage. On average 
we find that the availability of postretirement health insurance induces households to 




8.1 PSID Labor Supply 
We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the association between 
health status and other individual characteristics with labor supply. The long observa-
tion window of the PSID makes it well suited to studying the labor supply of individuals 
over the lifecycle. In order to match the household characteristics in lifecycle model, we 
used age, marital status, sex, self report of health, wealth, current earnings, and union 
status to predict annual hours worked. These data were available in a subset of the 
PSID observation years (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009). The 
analysis sample is described in table A1 and the OLS estimation results are found in 










Age 43.6 15.9 
Current Earnings $31,353 $54,437 
Net Worth $246,886 $1,375,000 
Percentage 
Female 54% 
Union Member 9% 
Health 
Excellent 22% 















MODEL OF ANNUAL LABOR SUPPLY (HOURS)
 
Coeffi cient Robust S.E. 
Age 46.73*** 3.15 
Age2 -0.67*** 0.03 
Female -458.74*** 21.41 
Union Member 250.17*** 15.28 
Current Earnings ($1, 000) 5.26*** 1.05 
Net Worth ($1,000) -0.03*** 0.01 
Health 
(Excellent) 
Very Good 5.15 9.71 
Good -80.76*** 15.52 
Fair -343.09*** 25.62 
Poor -674.96*** 32.86 
Marital Status 
(Married) 
Never Married -20.96 13.39 
Widowed 114.95*** 17.11 
Divorced 165.59*** 14.90 
Separated 31.33 18.74 
Constant 1022.92*** 32.44 
R-squared 0.39 
N 106,619 
NOTE.-Standard error adjusted for 24,819 individual clusters 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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